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Chih-Sheng Lee, Chun-Yun Yang, Shui-Ping Chang, Yi-Chao Lee
Department of Environmental Engineering, Kun Shan University,949 Da Wan Road, Yun
Kan City, TAIWAN 71003 (cslee@mail.ksu.edu.tw)
Abstract: An untraditional multi-objective programming approach, called as fuzzy game
multi-objective optimization model (FGMOM), is illustrated to discuss suitability and
significances in the problems of sustainable watershed management. FGMOM is developed
based on the combination of fuzzy set theory, game theory and traditional multi-objective
programming. The model is implemented to support decision making process for balancing
economic and environmental paradox in reservoir watershed management. Particularly in
this study, FGMOM is used as an alternative tool for analyzing strategic interaction
between economic development and environmental protection which is involving vague
and imprecise information related to data, model formulation, and the decision maker’s
preferences. Results show that analysis of economic and environmental balance can be
easily interpreted to aid the decision maker for watershed management. For comparison, a
traditional multi-objective approach was used to contrast the comprehensive use and
robustness from FGMOM analysis. In addition, the application of FGMOM is further
discussed.
Keywords: Fuzzy mathematical programming; Watershed management; Multi-objective
optimization; Game theory; Conflict analysis.
1.

INTRODUCTION

Multi-objective programming problems exist almost everywhere, including environmental
facilities [Giannikos, 1998], water resources management [Lee and Wen, 1996], watershed
management [Lee and Wen, 1995]. In these problems, one of the challenges for the
decision makers (DMs) is to choose an appropriate alternative among a set of alternative
actions. In the past decade, many techniques have expanded based on multi-objective
programming approaches, such as artificial neural network [Wen and Lee, 1998], fuzzy set
theory [Wang and Liang, 2004], game theory [Nishizaki and Sakawa, 2001], genetic
algorithm [Leung and Wang, 2000], grey theory [Hsu and Wen, 2000]. In this study, we
developed a fuzzy game multi-objective optimization model (FGMOM) for economic and
environmental balance in a reservoir watershed.
For the past three decades, there have been lots of studies in literature discussing the topic
of fuzzy games. Butnariu [1978] perhaps first introduced the concept of fuzzy sets in noncooperative games. Aubin [1981] discussed cooperative games with fuzzy coalitions.
Nishizaki and Sakawa [1995] developed equilibrium solutions of fuzzy goals for games in
fuzzy and multi-objective environments. Dhingra and Rao [1995] combined cooperative
game theory and fuzzy set theory to yield new cooperative fuzzy games, and further
examined the utility and applicability in an engineering design process. Nishizaki and
Sakawa [2000] formulated a fuzzy cooperative game based on a linear programming
problem with fuzzy parameters for a production problem. Molina and Tejada [2002]
analyzed lexicographical solutions for fuzzy games, and studied their properties and
characterization. Li and Cheng [2002] developed fuzzy multi-objective optimization
methods for fuzzy constrained matrix games. Branzei et al. [2003] studied the cone of
convex cooperative fuzzy games and examined their fuzzy Shapley value. Garagic and

C.-S. Lee et al. / Sustainable watershed management by fuzzy game optimization

Cruz, Jr. [2003] first defined a new approach to N-person static fuzzy non-cooperative
games and developed a solution concept. Branzei et al. [2004] introduced an egalitarian
solution for convex fuzzy games by adjusting the classical Dutta–Ray algorithm for convex
crisp games. Bector et al. [2004] also proposed fuzzy linear programming models to solve
fuzzy matrix games. Peldschus and Zavadskas [2005] combined fuzzy sets and matrix
game theories for multi-criteria decision-making. They illustrated a case study for selecting
the variants water supply systems. Hwang [2007] introduced two types of “reduced game”
to cooperative fuzzy games and defined the related properties of consistency and converse
consistency. Larbani [2009] surveyed most of the approaches for solving non-cooperative
fuzzy games in normal form. In addition, applications of these games were also discussed.
Yu and Zhang [2010] proposed a generalized form of fuzzy game and extended as a
cooperative fuzzy game. They also provided a practical application for production problem.
Chen et al. [2010] formulated a game framework for strategic behavior of supply chain
partners based on fuzzy multi-objective programming.
To our best knowledge, combined implementation of FGMOM has never been performed
in watershed management in that one needs to balance between economical development
(EcoD) and environmental protection (EnvP). Consequently, this study was undertaken
using a fuzzy game approach to provide the DMs a clear choice in selecting an appropriate
alternative. Results of FGMOM for watershed management may further expand the
application of traditional multi-objective optimization in water resources area. For
comparison, a traditional multi-objective approach was used to contrast the comprehensive
use and robustness from FGMOM analysis.
2.

MODELS

A traditional model of multi-objective programming is
Max Z(x) = [Z1(x), Z2(x), …, Zp(x)]
s.t. gj(x) ≤ 0, j = 1, 2, …, m
xk ≥ 0, k = 1, 2, ..., n

(1)

Solution of the multi-objective programming model employs the concept of Pareto optimal,
also known as the non-inferior solution. The bi-objective for EnvP is to minimize impact
on the environment (less total phosphorus (TP) load), whereas EcoD is to maximize the
utility function of income. Thus, the bi-objective programming model is
Min EnvP = Z1(x)
Max EocD = Z2(x)
s.t. gj(x) ≤ 0, j = 1, 2, …, m
xk ≥ 0, k = 1, 2, ..., n

(2)

Considering the imprecise nature inherent in human judgments in multi-objective
programming problems, the DM can specify his/her preferences for the corresponding
fuzzy goals. A fuzzy goal can be quantified by eliciting a corresponding membership
function. After the membership functions μ1(Z1(x)) and μ2(Z2(x)) have been elicited from
the DM, the fuzzy bi-objective programming model can be defined as
Max [μ1(Z1(x)), μ2(Z2(x))]
s.t. gj(x) ≤ 0, j = 1, 2, …, m
μ1(Z1(x)) = h1 (x)
μ2(Z2(x)) = h2 (x)
xk ≥ 0, k = 1, 2, ..., n

(3)

By introducing a general aggregation function, we can define a general fuzzy multiobjective decision making problem by
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Max μD(μ(Z(x))
s.t. gj(x) ≤ 0, j = 1, 2, …, m
μ1(Z1(x)) = h1 (x)
μ2(Z2(x)) = h2 (x)
xk ≥ 0, k = 1, 2, ..., n

(4)

Value of μD(μ(Z(x)) can be interpreted to represent the overall degree of satisfaction with
the DM’s multiple fuzzy goals.
Fuzzy decision developed by Bellman and Zadeh [1970] is presented as
μD(μ(Z(x)) = Min [μ1(Z1(x)), μ2(Z2(x))]

(5)

Combining Equations (4) and (5), we can interpret the fuzzy decision making problem as
Max Min [μ1(Z1(x)), μ2(Z2(x))]
s.t. gj(x) ≤ 0, j = 1, 2, …, m
μ1(Z1(x)) = h1 (x)
μ2(Z2(x)) = h2 (x)
xk ≥ 0, k = 1, 2, ..., n

(6)

Max ν
s.t. ν ≤ μ1(Z1(x)),
ν ≤ μ2(Z2(x)),
gj(x) ≤ 0, j = 1, 2, …, m
μ1(Z1(x)) = h1 (x)
μ2(Z2(x)) = h2 (x)
xk ≥ 0, k = 1, 2, ..., n

(7)

or equivalently

If all of the membership functions μi(Zi(x)) are linear, the max-min problem becomes a
linear programming problem. Hence, one can obtain an optimal solution by applying the
simplex method of linear programming using LINDO software package [Schrange, 1991].
In this study, two players represent EnvP and EcoD, respectively. Their payoffs will be
identified as the following process.
Initially, each player will not be satisfied with the results from the other player’s objective,
i.e., FGMOM result for player 1 is far above his/her objective value (i.e., more TP load
than what he/she expects), and the corresponding value for player 2 is way below his/her
goal (i.e., much less that he/she wants). Thus, two players will begin another round of
negotiation and concession. For example, during the second negotiation, each player will
then set his/her objective value very close to initial EnvPgoal and EcoDgoal and see what
happens. As would be expected, each player is still not satisfied after the second negotiated
results. Consequently, a series of concessions and negotiations will be conducted by
adjusting player’s objective values, i.e., player 1 would relax more about his/her
environmental concern while player 2 lowers the economic income. After further
negotiations, difference between the reset objective values and FGMOM results becomes
less divergent. The negotiation process continues until final solutions of EnvP*, EcoD* can
be identified as:
For player 1:
EnvP* ≤ EnvPgoal

(8)

And for play 2:
EcoD* ≥ EcoDgoal
Pairs of solution (EnvP*, EcoD*) are called as Nash equilibrium points.
In summary, the computing process of FGMOM is briefly listed as

(9)
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Step 0: establishing original multi-objective optimization model;
Step 1: setting payoffs as strategies of players;
Step 2: fuzzifying objectives by membership functions;
Step 3: making decision by Bellman and Zadeh’s approach;
Step 4: checking Nash equilibrium (if not, go back to Step 1);
Step 5: obtaining optimization solutions.
3.

CASE STUDY

Developments for various land uses in reservoir watersheds are important in that from a
viewpoint of economic development, one of the important things is to allocate the
resources to different users for maximizing the income as higher as possible. On the other
hand, for watershed management, one of the important policies is to allocate the
distribution of land uses in which pollution would not reduce the assimilative capacity in
their receiving water-bodies, nor affecting water quality in reservoirs. Agricultural
activities and forest are major types of land uses in the mountainous area. However,
residential and recreational lands are not only highly profitable, but also result in polluted
runoff. They should be set their maximum areas for environmental protection and soil
conservation.
Non-point source pollution (also known as diffuse pollution) originates from natural
(forest) and agricultural land development (e.g., plantation of tea, betel nut, mustard),
feedlot (free-range chicken farms) as well as community and recreational sites. In this
study, the land uses are classified into major four categories (Table 1).
For each land use type, unit quantity of pollutant (for EnvP) and economic income (for
EcoD) must be known. Since phosphorus is the controlling element for eutrophication, only
TP is used in this study. Export TP values shown in Table 1 were taken from the
comprehensive study conducted by Wen et al. [2005]. Income values from any economic
development associated with respective land use were adopted from Council of
Agriculture, Government of Taiwan [2009]. Two objective functions and constraint set in
our study are listed in Table 2.
A membership function for TP impact is shown in Fig. 1(a). The desired TP quantity is
14,200 kg/yr and its mapping membership grade is 1.0. Similarly, the maximum possible
quantity is 26,800 kg/yr and its grade is assigned as zero. Another membership function for
total income in the entire watershed is shown in Fig. 1(b). The maximum income is 394
million USD/yr and its mapping membership grade is 1.0. The minimum possible income
may be 223 million USD/yr and its grade is assigned as zero.
4.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

4.1 FGMOM for identifying the goals of EnvP and EcoD
FGMOM can be converted into crisp (e.g., non-fuzzy) linear programming models that are
solved with conventional algorithm using LINDO software package [Schrange, 1991]. The
trade-off processes of watershed-management optimization are first established.
Consequently, four types of candidate solutions are generated and showed in Table 3. Type
I indicates the solutions of two objectives as Z1 = 19,150 kg TP/yr and Z2 = 327 million
USD/yr based on the payoffs of 0, 0.3, 0.5 for both of μ1(Z1(x)) and μ2(Z2(x)). Type II will
have the payoff values as μ1(Z1(x)) = 0.7 and μ2(Z2(x)) = 0, 0.3, and 0.5, respectively. The
solutions of two objectives are Z1 = 17,980 kg TP/yr and Z2 = 320 million USD/yr.
However, Type III have the payoff values as μ2(Z2(x)) = 0.7 and μ1(Z1(x)) = 0 and 0.3,
respectively. The solutions are Z1 = 20,800 kg TP/yr and Z2 = 343 million USD/yr. Type
IV has an extreme payoff of μ1(Z1(x)) = 1.0 and μ2(Z2(x)) = 0. The solutions are Z1 =
14,200 kg TP/yr and Z2 = 224 million USD/yr.
Results are summarized in Figure 2 for better illustration. The Nash equilibrium points of
Types I-III range from 17,980 to 20,800 kg TP/yr for EnvP; and that of objective 2 (EcoD)
between 320 and 343 million USD/yr. Area of decision variable residential (x1) is between
745 and 1,879 ha for its high income. Forest land (x2) is between 41,957 and 43,088 ha for
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its lower TP export load. Agricultural activities (x3) have their maximum area (2,166 ha)
due to its lower TP export load and higher income. Reservation (non-planted land, water
body and grass land area, x4) is 4,000 ha.
Table 1. Parameter values in the objective for reservoir watershed-management.
Parameter

Residential/recreational areas
(x1)

Forest
(x 2)

Agricultural activities
(x 3)

Reservation
(x 4)

Export coefficient of TP
(kg/ha/yr)

2.8

0.3

1.0

0.2

Income of land use or
development ( × 103
USD/ha/yr)

30

6

16

0

Table 2. Multi-objective model for a case study of the Tseng-Wen Reservoir.
Model component
Function
Objectives:
Min Z1(x) = 2.8x1 + 0.3x 2 + 1.0x 3 + 0.2x 4
1. TP loads
2. Total income
Max Z2(x) = 30x1 + 6x 2 + 16x 3 + 0x 4
Constraints:
1. Land availability
x1 + x 2 + x 3 + x 4 = 50,000
2. Forest area
x2 ≥ 35,778
3. Soil property
x3 ≤ 2166
4. Minimum agricultural area
x3 ≥ 164
5. Minimum residential/recreational areas
x1 ≥ 180
6. Land slope
x1 + x3 ≤ 4995
7. Minimum water-body/river-bank areas
x4 ≥ 4000
2.8x1 + 0.3x2 + 1.0x3 + 0.2x4 ≤ 63,500
8. TP assimilative capacity
x1, x2, x3, x4 ≥ 0
9. Non-negativity

μ(Z2(x))

μ(Z1(x))

14,200

26,800

223

Environmental Protection (kg TP/yr)

394
Economic Development (million USD/yr)

Figure 1. Membership functions for two objectives. (a) TP load and (b) income.
Table 3. Results of FGMOM for a case study of the Tseng-Wen Reservoir.
Payoffs
(μ(Z1(x)), μ(Z2(x)))

Z1
(kg TP/yr)

Z2
(million USD/yr)

x1 (ha)

x 2 (ha)

x 3 (ha)

x4 (ha)

(0, 0), (0, 0.3), (0, 0.5)
(0.3, 0), (0.3, 0.3), (0.3, 0.5)
(0.5, 0), (0.5, 0.3), (0.5, 0.5)

19150

327

1214

42620

2166

4000

(0.7, 0), (0.7, 0.3), (0.7, 0.5)

17980

320

745

43088

2166

4000

(0, 0.7), (0.3, 0.7)

20800

343

1879

41957

2166

4000
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(1, 0)

14200

224

180

36008

164

13648

4.2 Decision Making: Nash equilibrium versus Pareto optimality
Traditional multi-objective programming methods can generate many candidate solutions,
expanding a wide range of the objectives. Results are possibly difficult for the DMs to
select which alternative. For example, the DMs of economic affairs may choose the one
with larger income; on the other hand, the people in environmental field may choose the
lower TP load. To realize the usefulness of FGMOM model, a traditional multi-objective
analysis, constraint method, was also performed for comparison. Detailed procedures of
this method are shown elsewhere [Lee and Wen, 1996]. The solutions of constraint method
could be Pareto optimality [Messac and Mattson, 2004]. Therefore, analysts would then
select several appropriate values falling within the pay-off-table range and subject to
constraint of another objective function. Results of multi-objective analysis are also shown
in Figure 2. However, there are a lot of alternatives for the watershed-management problem
(depending on the values the analysts selected). For environmentist, he/she tends to select
alternatives with lower TP loading (lower left points in Figure 2). Conversely, for
economists, the choice is apparently the ones with higher economic income (upper right
points in Figure 2). Results of the multi-objective method can only be utilized for the DMs
without any prejudice about environment versus economy.
On the other hand, FGMOM is one of aggregative approaches and construct limited
satisfactory solutions according to the DMs’ preferences. The DMs served as players who
need to negotiate each other and have a series of concessions. The model has a range of the
solutions but converge efficiently to Nash equilibrium. Objective values will converge until
the Nash equilibrium is achieved (Figure 2). Range of Nash equilibrium serves a base for
the DMs to select the choice they wish to proceed. Since the range is not too wide, the DMs
may feel comfortable to make decision. Thus the eventual decision can accommodate both
environmental concerns and economic development.
In short, constraint method provides a set of data that analysts identify many solutions. The
solutions are all Pareto optimality, so the quality of solutions is better than that of FGMOM.
But they are possibly difficult for the DMs to select one. FGMOM indicates Nash
equilibrium points that players have focused their goals. After several negotiation attempts,
Nash equilibrium points were obtained. It is easy for the DMs to decide the one balancing
EnvP and EcoD.
35,000
Environmental protection (kg TP/yr)

FGMOM

30,000

traditional

25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

Economic Development (million USD/yr)

Figure 2 Results of FGMOM and traditional multi-objective analyses.
5.

CONCLUSIONS

A framework for decision making of land uses in reservoir watershed-management is
performed. Further applications along with fuzzy theory, game theory and multi-objective
programming to deal with conflict analysis for balancing environmental protection and
economic development are also formulated and resolved. The developed models have been
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applied to an illustration for identifying reservoir watershed-management solutions.
Modeling results have been generated, demonstrating complex tradeoffs among the balance
between economic development and environmental protection. Solutions, based on
FGMOM, reflect compromises between maximized income and minimized TP impact in a
watershed. The results suggest that these models are also applicable to many other
environmental management problems.
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